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THE HUMAN PSYCHE’S EFFECT ON ARBITRAL WITNESS ACCURACY
By
Caroline Skaff*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Witness testimony can be key to the success of many cases, whether that be
criminal or civil. Almost every criminal law movie pivots on witness testimony that
makes or breaks the case.1 Plenty of research has been done analyzing the effects of the
environment and circumstances on memory recall in daily life, as well as in the criminal
justice setting.2 But what about in the arbitral setting?3 Given that arbitration is a civil
matter handled outside of the traditional Article III court system, do the same issues with
memory recall affect the results of an arbitral case?4 This article determines that the
issues present in the criminal justice setting are just as prevalent in the arbitral setting and
that it is important the relevant actors are aware of their effect.
This article discusses the results of the International Chamber of Commerce’s
(hereinafter “ICC”) report titled The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International
Arbitration (hereinafter referred to as “the Report”), while also diving deeper into the
psychological phenomena that play a role in memory recall and the effects of such
phenomena on memory formation. First, this article provides an introduction and brief
overview of the human brain and memory recall. Second, this article discusses research
conducted regarding the “misinformation effect” in false information presentation and
question phrasing, and other cognitive biases. Third, this article further incorporates
research conducted on the accuracy of witness testimony in the criminal context and the
overall effects on the limitations of human recall. Lastly, this article investigates how
educating the arbitral players about what can affect memory distortions can potentially
mitigate their distortive effects.5

*

Caroline Skaff is a Senior Editor of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2022 Juris Doctor Candidate at Penn
State Law.
1. Stephen L. Chew, Myth: Eyewitness Testimony is the Best Kind of Evidence, ASS’N FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.psychologicalscience.org/teaching/myth-eyewitnesstestimony-is-the-best-kind-of-evidence.html (“[e]yewitness testimony is historically the most convincing
forms of evidence in criminal trials . . . and has been dramatized often on television and movies”).
2. See generally The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, INT’L CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2020/11/icc-arbitration-adr-commission-report-onaccuracy-fact-witness-memory-international-arbitration-english-version.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
3. See generally id.
4. See, e.g., id.
5. See, e.g., id.
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II.

THE ICC’S REPORT ON WITNESS TESTIMONY IN THE ARBITRAL SETTING

Minimal research has been conducted specifically addressing the question of
witness testimony and its reliability in the arbitral setting. However, the ICC recently
published the Report, which is one of the first reports of its kind to address the specific
question of witness accuracy in arbitration.6 The ICC created the Task Force Maximizing
the Probative Value of Witness Evidence (“Task Force”) to conduct research and analysis
on the tactics undertaken during the preparation and questioning of arbitral witnesses, and
whether these tactics affected the witness’s memory recall.7 The overall conclusion of the
report was that the memory of even the most honest of witnesses can be distorted and
confused through questioning tactics, circumstances, exposure to outside information,
and other common psychological phenomena.8 These findings ultimately mean that
human memory is malleable and subject to distortion in all settings.9
The Task Force was charged with looking at previous scientific studies conducted
on memory recall and what affects it, analyzing arbitral practice, and determining what
modifications to practice could be implemented to increase witness reliability.10 Because
majority of the previous scientific studies analyzed were conducted in the criminal
context, the Task Force, headed by Dr. Kimberly A. Wade11, conducted its own
independent study and experiment on reliability of witnesses in the business context.12
The results of that independent study will be discussed later in this article.
The justice system has implemented certain safeguards to ensure that evidence
presented at trial is reliable. The Federal Rules of Evidence establish the rules that federal
courts utilize when admitting evidence at trial. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 requires that
for evidence to be admitted at trial, it has to be relevant to the case at hand.13 This
relevancy standard creates a safeguard against unreliable evidence being admitted at trial.
The Federal Rules of Evidence have many additional rules to aid in the relevancy and

6. See The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 7.
9. See generally id.
10. See id. at 5.
11. Dr. Kimberly A. Wade of the Department of Psychology at the University of Warwick is a cognitive
psychologist who focusses her research on the complexities of the human memory. Dr. Wade has published
numerous articles, several of which analyze various aspects of witness memory recall in the criminal justice
context. See DR. KIMBERLY WADE, https://www.kimberleywade.net/ (last visited July 10, 2021).
12. The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2 at 5, 41-44.
13. Fed. R. Evid. 402.
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reliability inquisition that is conducted before admitting something into trial.14
Specifically relating to eyewitness testimony, Federal Rule of Evidence 802 states that
hearsay is barred from admission.15 This rule against admitting out-of-court statements
for the truth of the matter asserted is intended to prevent unreliable testimony from being
used in the court room.16 In the arbitral setting, no such safeguards are required.17
Given that arbitration is a creature of contract, there is no uniform rule of law that
is required to be used across arbitral proceedings.18 There is no “comprehensive
framework” of rules to be used in arbitration and while “some regimes reference the
[Federal Rules of Evidence], it is only to distinguish the need to follow them, rather than
an incorporation of the explicit concepts of evidence law in the arbitral form.”19 An
analysis of evidence rules presented by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”),
JAMS, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) showed that the
“arbitration rule regimes surveyed typically apply only to the thresholds of ‘relevance’
and ‘materiality.’”20 Although different arbitral regimes have rules and regulations
surrounding the introduction of evidence, the lack of uniformity creates a strain on the
reliability of the evidence presented, therefore placing stress specifically on the reliability
of eyewitness testimony. In sum, arbitration operates outside the traditional court system
safeguards in place to ensure evidentiary reliability. This article and its analysis of the
Report seeks to cast some light on the reliability of witness testimony in an arbitration
hearing.
III.

OVERVIEW OF THE HUMAN BRAIN AND INTRODUCTION TO MEMORY RECALL

The process of memory is multifaceted and depends on whether the memory
being stored is a short term memory or a long term memory.21 For the purposes of this

14. See generally Fed. R. Evid.
15. Fed. R. Evid. 802.
16. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 802.
17. See, e.g., Paul Radvany, The Importance of the Federal Rules of Evidence in Arbitration, 36 REV. LITIG.
469, 493 (2016) (highlighting that arbitration is a “creature of contract,” and therefore many parties opt to
use certain rule regimes, though there is not a level of uniformity in that choice).
18. See id.
19. Id. at 493.
20. Id. at 504.
21. See, e.g., Memory and Recall, BERKELEY CTR. FOR TEACHING & LEARNING,
https://teaching.berkeley.edu/resources/learn/memory-and-recall (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
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article, the complexities of the subject are simplified to a more basic three-step process of
memory processing: (1) encoding, (2) storage, and (3) recall.22
When encoding a memory or message, the brain takes visual, audio, and other
sensory cues, then converts them into information that can be perceived and digested.23
For example, when a person looks at a tree, that image is transformed into a visual signal
that the brain sends through various neural pathways, through the temporal and parietal
lobes, which allow the signal to be “encoded” for the person to recognize that
information as a tree.24 “Information has to go through this processs so that it can be
understood in a meaningful way.”25 Next, the encoded information is stored in the brain
as either a short term or a long term memory.26 Storing the information allows the brain
to “maintain information over periods of time.”27 The last step in the process is memory
retrieval.28 Memory retrieval is when the information that was encoded and stored gets
pulled back to the surface in the form of a memory.29 However, memory recall is more
than just pulling information to the surface, “it is a process of creativity in which the
relevant information is gathered from a scattered, jigsaw puzzle-like information in the
brain.”30
The questions of how accurate a witness’s memory is and how much weight we
should place on their testimony stems from the fact that memories can be unintentionally
distorted and easily manipulated during the recall phase.31 “The belief that a confident
memory is always highly accurate and resistant to distortion or loss is an unfortunate
misunderstanding of memory.”32 Studies have shown that jurors place a high persuasive
value on a witness’s testimony if the witness appears confident in the memory they are
22. See Memory Recall and Retrieval System, THE HUM. MEMORY, https://human-memory.net/memoryrecall-retrieval/ (last updated Nov. 25, 2020).
23. See Memory Encoding, THE HUM. MEMORY, https://human-memory.net/memory-encoding/ (last
updated Nov. 25, 2020).
24. See generally id.
25. See, e.g., id.
26. Introduction to Memory, BOUNDLESS PSYCHOL., https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundlesspsychology/chapter/introduction-to-memory/ (last visited April 9, 2021).
27. Id.
28. See Memory Recall and Retrieval System, supra note 22.
29. See, e.g., id.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see, e.g., The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2.
32. Joyce W. Lacy & Craig E. L. Stark, The Neuroscience of Memory: Implications for the Courtroom, 14
NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 649, 649 (2013).
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recalling.33 Further, in the case of criminal convictions, “mistaken eyewitness
identification occurred in 75% or more of cases in which a convicted individual was later
exonerated.”34 This indicates that jurors put a high probative value on eyewitness
testimony, likely because they do not understand the complexities of testimony and the
potential problems a witness may encounter with memory recall.35
Additionally, the ability to recall details of an event relies heavily on where one’s
attention is placed at the time of the event.36 For example, the “weapon effect” occurs
when “a witness is involved in a situation in which a weapon is present.”37 In this
situation, because the witness has focused their attentions so heavily on the weapon, they
will likely remember the other details of the event inaccurately due to their narrowed
focus.38 Although different environments and circumstances may affect the way people
think and feel, the psychological processes and phenomena that distort memory recall are
present in every situation people face.39
In the arbitral setting, witnesses testify for a variety of reasons, varying from
being relatively low in probative value to being very high in probative value.40 Given the
information presented in the previous paragraph, it is likely that no matter how probative
the testimony is to the proceeding, the tribunal is likely to put a considerable amount of
weight on the testimony.41 Due to this assumption, it is important for the parties to an
arbitral proceeding to be educated on the most prevalent flaws in memory and how the
flaws affect the proceeding.42

33. See, e.g., Lacy & Stark, supra note 32.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See generally 10 Influencial Memory Theories and Studies in Psychology, PSYCHOLOGIST WORLD,
https://www.psychologistworld.com/memory/influential-memory-psychology-studies-experiments (last
visited Feb. 27, 2021).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., id.
39. See Chew, supra note 1 (note that “stress and terror can inhibit memory formation” and memories from
these situations often continue forming after the fact based on outside information); see also Lacy & Stark,
supra note 32.
40. See generally The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2, at 19.
41. See, e.g., id.
42 Id. at 25-26.
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IV.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA AND THEIR EFFECT ON MEMORY RECALL
A. The “Misinformation Effect” in False Information Presentation

Interference in memory retrieval can cause a person to alter their memory based
on new information they are presented with, or old information that intrudes on the recall
of the newer memories.43 The “misinformation effect” demonstrates how the introduction
of outside information, whether accurate or inaccurate, affects human recall.44 Elizabeth
Loftus, the first to study the “misinformation effect”, found that “participants easily
assimilated [the] flawed information” causing them to inaccurately recall the details of an
event.45 Numerous studies conducted have shown that young adults are “often susceptible
to misinformation, but that children and older adults can be even more susceptible.”46
Although these studies involve intentionally placing incorrect or misleading information
in front of the participant to see if they integrate it into their memory, “indirect
information may be incorporated into the witness’s report of the event.”47
The “misinformation effect” is very prominent in the arbitral setting.48 “Hundreds
of experiments conducted in laboratories all over the world have demonstrated that
people unwittingly adopt misleading suggestions as their own memories … Talking to
co-witnesses after an event … or retelling an experience to friends or officials are all

43 See generally Cynthia P. May, PhD & Gilles O. Einstein, PhD, Memory: A Five-Day Unit Lesson Plan
for High School Psychology Teachers, AM. PSYCHOL. INST. (Nov. 2013) at 23,
https://www.apa.org/ed/precollege/topss/lessons/memory.pdf (“retroactive interference occurs when new
information blocks or disrupts retrieval of older information” and “proactive interference occurs when old,
previously learned memories intrude with the recall of newer memories”).
44 See, e.g., The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2; see also Helen
Lee Bouygues, The Misinformation Effect and the Psychology Behind Fake News, REBOOT ELEVATED
CRITICAL THINKING, https://reboot-foundation.org/misinformation-effect/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2021)
(defining the misinformation effect and outlining various ways for “how to fight misinformation”).
45 Bouygues, supra note 44. In this study, participants were shown slides of a car accident and were later
given misleading information about the accident to read over. The study showed these participants blended
the flawed information into their recollection of the car accident, completely misrepresenting what they had
actually seen because of the misleading information they read.; see also The Accuracy of Fact Witness
Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2, at 31 (outlining several studies conducted by Elizabeth
Loftus).
46 Cara Laney & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony and Memory Biases, UNIV. OF
SASKATCHEWAN, https://openpress.usask.ca/introductiontopsychology/chapter/eyewitness-testimony-andmemory-biases/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
47 Danna M. Challies, Maree Hunt, Maryanne Garry, & David N. Harper, Whatever Gave You That Idea?
False Memories Following Equivalence Training: A Behavioral Accout of the Misinformation Effect, 96 J.
OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAV. 343 (2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3213001/.
48. See generally The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2.
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opportunities for [post event information] to creep into memories.”49 The likelihood of
post-event information being presented to witnesses in an arbitral proceeding is
extremely high.50
Another way that misinformation can mold a witness’s memory through the
interview process is based on “post-identification feedback.”51 In the criminal context, it
has been shown that positive “post-identification feedback” has increased a witness’s
confidence in their memory, and negative “post-identification feedback” decreases their
confidence.52 This is likely to be present in the arbitral setting as well. Counsel could
increase the witness’s confidence by indicating that other witnesses have recalled the
event in the same way, or undercut the witness’s confidence in their testimony by
indicating that another witness has contradicted what they said.53 The impact these
interactions have on the witness’s memory is critical as the increased or decreased
confidence will allow the witness to lock in, or question, their recall of the events and
possibly cause them to mold their memories to fit the template they have been presented.
A study conducted by Malen Migueles and Elvira García-Bajos54 illustrated how
witnesses to a kidnapping are as likely to integrate false information into their memories
as the aforementioned studies indicate.55 In this study, participants were shown a video of
a kidnapping, followed by a recognition test consisting of various sentences indicating
incidents that occurred during the video, both true and false.56 The participants were
asked to answer on a scale of one to five their confidence that each sentence was depicted
in the video.57 The study showed that the subjects “erroneously accepted 85% of the false
central actions,” meaning the subjects were confident that these actions occurred in the
kidnapping video, even though they did not.58 This likely occurred because the false
recognition sentences “fit well into the event,” as opposed to other studies that give
49. The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2, at 5.
50. See, e.g., id.
51. See, e.g., Lacy & Stark, supra note 32.
52. Id. (“informing a witness that their choice in a suspect line-up matched the police suspect . . . increases
the eyewitness’ level of confidence in their choice”).
53. See id.
54. Malen Migueles and Elvira García-Bajos conducted this study through the University of the Basque
Country where Migueles is a faculty member for the psychology department. Both Migueles and GarcíaBajos have published numerous articles relating to human psychology.
55. See generally Malen Migueles & Elvira García-Bajos, Recall, Recognition, and Confidence Patterns in
Eyewitness Testimony, 13 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 257, 264-66 (1999).
56. Id. at 260.
57. Id. at 259.
58. Id. at 265.
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peripheral information.59 The subjects’ integration of these false central actions into their
recall demonstrates how the misinformation effect is always at work.60 Thus, the
presentation of false information to a witness, no matter the context, will likely have a
critical impact on their recall of the event.
For example, in the arbitral setting, it is common for counsel to interview
witnesses together to save time and expenses.61 Engaging in this practice allows for
witnesses to be presented with information from other sources that will ultimately mold
how they recall the same event. Imagine a situation in which counsel is interviewing two
employees, John and Jane. Counsel asks John, “what was Jane doing at this time?” and
John responds with what he thought he saw Jane doing. However, Jane doesn’t recall this
moment in time, but because she is in the same interview, she incorporates what John
perceived into her own retelling of the story. By doing so, Jane used John’s perception of
the event in her own recall, ultimately distorting her memory to fit that sequence of
events.
B. The “Misinformation Effect” in Question Phrasing
Another way the “misinformation effect” presents is through word choice during
questioning. Several studies have indicated that the qualifying descriptor in a question
changes the response of the witness.62 For example, one study showed that participants
who were asked how long the movie was answered, on average, that it was thirty minutes
longer than those who were asked how short the movie was.63 “It is evident from these
studies that subtle changes in the way an initial round of questions is presented … can
distort a witness’ memory of an event when tested at a later date.”64 The presupposition
of a target object injected into a question is also likely to be incorporated into the
witness’s memory as a result.65 In a study examining this, when the participant was asked
if they saw “the” broken headlight, they recalled seeing a broken headlight even though
there was not one.66 This is because the use of “the” indicates an assumption of

59. Migueles & García-Bajos, supra note 55.
60. Id.
61. See The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2.
62. Id. at 32.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 34.
65. See, e.g., Challies, et al., supra note 47.
66. Id.

8

the existence of the object, so the participant subconsciously presumes its existence as a
fact.67
Taking the “misinformation effect” into consideration, it is safe to assume that
witness testimony can be easily altered by the counselor who is asking the questions, by
leading the witness through the use of specific verbs and presuppositions.68 Additionally,
the ICC concluded that the studies assessed by the Task Force indicated “compelling
evidence that changing one word within a question can systematically change the
evidence a witness recounts about a particular feature of an event.”69
Applying this concept to the arbitral setting, imagine John is being questioned by
counsel during an arbitral proceeding. Consider it is a breach of fiduciary duty case,
where John’s stock broker made unauthorized investments on John’s behalf, ultimately
putting John at a loss, and did so for the benefit of the company and the pay out they
could have received from the investment.70 When questioning John, counsel asks “Isn’t it
true that your broker would be authorized to trade on your behalf when you gave him the
blanket authority to do what was in your best interest?” For the purposes of this example,
John had not given his broker the blanket authority to do this. However, counsel’s
inclusion of the presupposition “the” in the question may skew John’s memory of that
fact by creating an assumption of its existence, as aforementioned in this section. Thus,
counsel’s intentional wording of the question could affect John’s response and memory
recall, ultimately favoring the position of counsel in this example.
C. Other Cognitive Biases
Cognitive biases are prevalent in everyone’s memory recall. Cognitive bias occurs
because the brain attempts to simplify all of the information it is presented by being
selective with the information it stores, allowing “subtle biases [to] creep in and influence
the way you see and think about the world.”71 The Report illustrates that when a witness
to an arbitration proceeding takes a particular perspective on the information they are
recalling, typically in favor of whichever party they are employed, the story is biased

67. See Challies, et al., supra note 47.
68. Memory Recall and Retrieval System, supra note 22 (“the specific and precise wording of a question
dramatically changes the recall and recreation of memories which may also lead to permanent changing of
existing memories and the creation of false memories”).
69. The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2, at 33.
70. Common Causes of Action in FINRA Arbitration, ZAMANSKY LLC,
https://www.zamansky.com/common-causes-of-action-in-finra-arbitration/ (Aug. 26, 2015). “If the
financial advisor advances his or her own interests or the interests of their firm to a clients’ detriment, the
client may be entitled to compensation for their losses.”
71. Kendra Cherry, What is Cognitive Bias?, VERYWELL MIND, https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-acognitive-bias-2794963 (reviewed on July 19, 2020).
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towards that party.72 The biased retelling of the story ultimately leads to a bias in the
witness’s memory.73 One study showed that an initial biased retelling of the story
impacts the witness’s recall of the story at a later time to also bias towards their initial
position.74 This means witnesses have a tendency to recall the information that favors
their position, and a tendency to be more forgetful of the unfavorable or contradictory
information.75
A similar study was conducted in the criminal context.76 When participants were
asked to recall facts of specific crimes, their biased perspective caused them to recall
more incriminating information relating to one suspect over the other.77 Similarly, this
initial biased retelling of the information also caused these participants to have a biased
recall of the events at a later time, again favoring the facts that incriminated the suspect
they were more biased towards.78 Given the parallels of these two studies, the congruities
of their results indicate that there is no difference between the criminal and civil context –
and presumably the same effect would occur in the arbitration setting.79 Although
people’s internal narrative may say that these contexts are entirely different, the human
brain does not differentiate between these settings. Being that, no matter the context, the
psychological processes of the human brain remain the same.
V.

SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO AVOID RETROSPECTIVE INTERFERENCE AND WHY THESE
SUGGESTIONS ARE PROBLEMATIC
A. The ICC Report’s Recommendations for Counsel and the Tribunal

The ICC Report concludes there are ways for arbitral tribunals and counsel to
avoid having the aforementioned psychological biases impact the testimony of their
witnesses.80 The ICC recommends that in-house counsel “take steps to mitigate or
eliminate” what can cause memory distortions by having potential witnesses write out
72. The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2, at 13.
73. Id. at 38.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 38.
77. The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2.
78. Id. at 39.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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their statements immediately after the event, emphasizing the importance that the
witness’s testimony reflect what they recall, and interviewing the witnesses individually
to attempt to avoid the misinformation effect.81 For outside counsel, the ICC recommends
that the witnesses be interviewed as close to the event as possible and for there to be two
separate interviews where the witness is questioned individually, in an attempt to ensure
they get the full detail of the situation.82
The Report also suggests that a witness be provided with “instructions” prior to
their examination to aid in the mitigation of memory distortive factors.83 A witness
should be aware of the importance of “distinguishing between personal knowledge and
information gained post-event from secondary sources” while providing their testimony,
and understand which they are speaking on.84 Although one who has had their memory
distorted by the aforementioned factors is not likely to be aware that they are recalling
false memories, if a witness is uncertain about the clarity of the memory, they are
permitted to note that to the tribunal.85 Providing the witness with instruction on how to
testify and bringing to their attention how their memories may have unintentionally been
molded by other information may result in better eyewitness testimony.86 Further,
arbitration witnesses could be instructed on how phrasing of a question will change their
perception of the event, specifically informing them that the use of presuppositions can
cause them to perceive the existence of an object that was not actually present. Providing
an arbitral witness with this relevant information allows them to be more thoughtful in
their answers and rely primarily on memories with the most clarity and to avoid using
foggy memories and post-event information in their testimony.
B. Recommendations in the Criminal Context
Many in our current system have attempted to address the importance of these
psychological phenomena and properly educate both the general public and those in legal
professions.87 In the criminal setting, jurors place heavy value on a witness’s testimony
81. The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2, at 20.
82. Id. at 21-22 (the Report lays out some guidelines for the interview process, suggesting the interviewer
attempt to use as neutral, and unsuggestive language as possible when conducting the interview).
83. Id. at 26.
84. Id.
85. Id. (the tribunal shall explain that “it is permissible to answer ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I don’t recall’ as
memories are incomplete”).
86. See generally The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2, at 2126.
87. See generally id.; Lacy & Stark, supra note 32; Bouygues, supra note 44; see generally Katherine
Puddifoot, Re-Evaluating the Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony: The Misinformation Effect and the
Overcritical Juror, 17(2) EPISTEME 255 (2020).
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and may even convict based solely on such testimony.88 Particularly, if a witness appears
to be confident in their testimony, a jury is likely to find the testimony highly persuasive
and perhaps even conclusive of the case at hand.89 However, “confidence does not
necessarily indicate accuracy” and studies have shown that there is no direct correlation
between confidence and accuracy.90 By educating jurors in regard to how confidence
does not correlate to the accuracy of memory recall, jurors may place less weight on
eyewitness testimony and rely more on a balance between the testimony and the other
evidence presented.91 Although this could be done through a jury instruction, courts have
begun to recognize that “the methods traditionally employed for alerting juries to the
fallibility of eyewitness identifications – cross examination, closing argument, and
generalized jury instructions on the subject – frequently are not adequate to inform them
of the factors affecting the reliability of such identifications.”92 Furthermore, jurors
should be instructed on how the wording of questions can affect witness memory; how
presenting the witness with new information after the fact can distort memory and even
give them false memories; and how various biases affect memory recall.93 General
statements reflecting the importance of misinformation and its effects will likely have
more positive results.94 Though juries and jury instructions are nonexistent in the arbitral
setting, arbitrators and the arbitral process in general may benefit from training and
instruction on witness recall while testifying.
C. The Possible Consequences of Increasing Education on these Psychological
Phenomena
Overall, the ICC suggests that all players to an arbitration “educate themselves to
better understand the workings of human memory, particularly since research continues
to refine the understanding of human memory.”95 Many other academics suggest that

88. Lacy & Stark, supra note 32.
89. Id.; see, e.g., Puddifoot, supra note 87.
90. Lacy & Stark, supra note 32.
91. Id. at 655. It has been shown that jurors often place heavy weight on eyewitness testimony. Thus, it is
important to remind the jurors that “‘perfect’ memories that are accompanied by a high level of confidence
and detail should be taken with a grain of salt and ‘imperfect’ memories that are vague and missing details
should not be immediately discredited.”
92. State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218, 243 (Conn. 2012).
93. Lacy & Stark, supra note 32.
94. Bouygues, supra note 44.
95. The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2, at 25.
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education may allow parties to better prepare for cases involving eyewitness testimony.96
It has been noted that counsel should recognize that how information is elicited from a
witness will affect their strategy in utilizing the witness’ testimony and how to support or
attack the testimony.97
It appears courts may be following in these scholars’ footsteps.98 In State v.
Guilbert, the Connecticut court held that in certain circumstances, expert testimony on
the reliability of eyewitness testimony may be permitted and helpful for the jury to
understand the intricacies of memory.99 The court reasoned that jury instructions are not
an adequate form to educate the jurors on reliability of eyewitness testimony because the
instructions are given too late after the jurors have already created their perception of the
witness.100 The court further indicated that jury instructions are too generalized to give
the jury an accurate understanding of the issues that eyewitness testimony presents,
ultimately concluding that “jury instructions are not effective at helping jurors spot
mistaken identifications.”101 However, there is a risk that when attorneys educate
themselves on how to avoid distortions, they are also learning tactics to lead the opposing
witness to testify to favor their position.
To illustrate, imagine a civil arbitration case in which there has been a car
accident, similar to the studies that were discussed above.102 And, in this arbitration, the
speed of the car relates to who is at fault in the accident, so counsel wants the witness to
say the car was going fast.103 If the counsel conducting the examination in the proceeding
knows the importance of the question’s wording, counsel can tailor the question to get the
witness to answer that the car was moving faster by asking how “fast” the car was going
96. See, e.g., ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, JAMES M. DOYLE, JENNIFER E. DYSART, & KAREN A. NEWIRTH,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (6th ed. 2020) (analyzes how questioning tactics and
different wording effects memory recall at all stages of a prosecution, starting with opening statements,
progressing through testimony and cross-examination, and ending with closing argument).
97. See Loftus, et al., supra note 96.
98. See, e.g., Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, Casenote: Should Jurors in Connecticut be
Educated about Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions?, 32 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 865 (2015); see, e.g., Derek Simmonsen, Comment: Teach Your Jurors Well: Using Jury Instructions
to Educate Jurors about Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, 70 MD. L. REV. 1044
(2011).
99. Denholtz & McDonough, supra note 98 (referencing State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218, 243 (2012)).
100. Id.
101. Id. (the court also reasoned that cross examination was inadequate because it is typically used to
differentiate lies from truth and that closing statements on eyewitness testimony are ineffective and “likely
to be viewed as ‘little more than partisan rhetoric’”); see also Guilbert, 306 Conn. at 244.
102. See generally Denholtz & McDonough, supra note 98; Bouygues, supra note 44; Migueles & GarcíaBajos, supra note 55; Challies, et al., supra note 47.
103. The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2, at 32.
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when it “smashed” into the other.104 Although the Report is likely correct that educating
the parties to the psychological phenomena that affect memory recall can help to mitigate
their distortive effects, it is also plausible that by learning the intricacies, the parties will
use them to their advantage.
Additionally, in the criminal context, the “overcritical juror argument” has been
proposed to suggest that educating jurors on the effects of these psychological
phenomena may cause them to place less credence on the testimony.105 Although this
could be a possibility, many studies have indicated that jurors place an extremely high
persuasive and probative value on eyewitness testimony.106 Therefore, providing jurors
with such information will allow them to cast a shadow of doubt on the witness
testimony, but it is unlikely it would fully diminish the persuasive value the jury finds in
eyewitness testimony.107 The same phenomena could also occur if arbiters are trained in
witness memory recall. However, just as in the criminal setting, although it is probable
that arbitrators will cast more doubt on the testimony, they are unlikely to be dismissive
of the testimony overall and will still give it probative value.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The ICC’s Report has exposed some critical problems surrounding eyewitness
testimony in the arbitral setting.108 The human brain is malleable and memories can be
distorted and changed with ease.109 As the above-mentioned studies show, the
“misinformation effect” and cognitive biases can have a very important effect on memory
recall, and can ultimately distort the way a witness remembers events occurring.110
Therefore, education on these subjects is important, not just for the arbitral
setting, but for the legal setting overall.111 However, educating on these subjects could
also increase the possibility that parties could implement strategies to intentionally distort
104. The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2, at 32 (“the stronger
the verb used to describe the collision, the faster the speed the participants estimated the cars had been
travelling”).
105. Puddifoot, supra note 87, at 260.
106. Lacy & Stark, supra note 32; The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra
note 2.
107. Contra to Puddifoot, supra note 87, at 260.
108. The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2.
109. See The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2.
110. See, e.g., id.; Migueles & García-Bajos, supra note 55; Lacy & Stark, supra note 32; Memory Recall
and Retrieval System, supra note 22.
111. Lacy & Stark, supra note 32; The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra
note 2; Loftus, et. al., supra note 96.
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or bias their witnesses’ memories. Although intentional manipulation is a concern,
studies have shown that even judges and law enforcement personnel do not have a clear
understanding of how memory can be distorted.112 By ensuring the arbitral tribunal,
juries, judges, and other important players in the legal system are educated on the factors
affecting memory distortion, they will have a greater understanding of how eyewitness
testimony should be weighed against the other evidence. Specifically, because in an
arbitral setting the tribunal makes the ruling, the tribunal must be informed on these
issues so they can make the best decision in light of all the evidence, appropriately
weighing the eyewitness testimony against the rest.113

112. Lacy & Stark, supra note 32 (“although judges and law enforcement personnel agreed with memory
experts on more statements regarding memory myths than did jurors, their understanding of the majority of
memory myths still differed from memory experts”).
113. See, e.g., The Accuracy of Fact Witness Memory in International Arbitration, supra note 2.
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